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How Much Does Education
Matter and Why?
The Effects of Education on Socio-economic
Outcomes among School-leavers in the
Netherlands
Rolf K. W. van der Velden and Maarten H. J. Wolbers
This article explores the total (measured and unmeasured) impact of education on
some of the main socio-economic outcomes (that is, employment opportunities,
job security and wages) among school-leavers who finished upper secondary or
tertiary education in the Netherlands. The empirical analysis shows that the effects
of education are typically underestimated in labour market research. Education has
a large impact on all outcomes under investigation. Apart from level of education,
the selectivity of the study programme turns out to affect socio-economic outcomes,
although the effects of the latter educational characteristic are only significant in
the private sector. Differences between schools do not have an impact on wages
and job security, but they do to some extent affect employment opportunities.
Introduction
This article focuses on the effects of education on
various socio-economic outcomes among school-
leavers who finished upper secondary or tertiary
education in the Netherlands. These different socio-
economic outcomes reflect some of the main dimen-
sions of the labour market position of school-leavers:
employment opportunities, job security, and wages.
Different theories predict different effects of education
on these outcomes. The effects of education may be
related to two different sources. On the one hand, it
may relate to having followed a specific field of study
(for instance, sociology) at a particular level of
education (for instance, master level). From now on,
we refer to this as study programme effects. On the
other hand, it may relate to having attended a specific
educational institution (for instance, university X).
From now on, we refer to that as school effects.
A lot of sociological research has found clear and
undisputedeffectsofthelevelofthestudyprogrammeon
employment opportunities, occupational status, and
earnings (for recent contributions see Shavit and
Mu ¨ller, 1998; Kerckhoff et al., 2001; Mu ¨ller and Gangl,
2003). Moreover, study programme effects have been
demonstrated regarding differences between vocational
and academic programmes (Bishop, 1989) and differ-
ences between fields of study (van de Werfhorst and
Kraaykamp, 2001). School effects have been established,
for instance, with respect to the reputation of the college
(Wilson and Smyth-Lovin, 1983), the social network of
the college (Rosenbaum et al., 1999), and the quality of
the school (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000).
A drawback of this research is that it usually focuses
on the effects of specific characteristics and rarely takes
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result in an underestimation of the actual effects of
education, because the models in question only reflect
the effect of some measured characteristics, such as
the level of education. Even in the case where other
characteristics of education are taken into account,
the conducted analysis only reflects the effects of the
measured characteristics, which still leaves the possibi-
lity that there are other (unmeasured) characteristics
that matter.
At the same time, however, the effects of education
may well be overestimated. Part of what seems to be
an effect of education is actually spurious, because
students are differentially selected into study pro-
grammes. Without adequate control for student
composition, the effects of study programmes may be
overestimated. The same holds for the effects of
schools. For example, part of the school differences
may be related to the fact that schools are located in
different regions, which in turn face different labour
market situations. Without adequate control for these
regional effects, the school effects may well be
overestimated. We can see a similar point of view in
the school effectiveness research (Scheerens and
Bosker, 1997), where school effects are defined as the
added value of the school, controlling for input
characteristics. The net effects of schools (that is, the
effects after controlling for input characteristics) are
usually found to be much smaller than the gross
effects.
This means that the essential question here about
the extent to which education affects socio-economic
outcomes is still very much open for discussion.
Multilevel analysis offers a solution for the under-
estimation problem, since it enables adequate estima-
tion of the total (measured and unmeasured) effect
of education in a hierarchical data structure (Snijders
and Bosker, 1999). By controlling for relevant input
characteristics of the students and characteristics in
the school environment, we also try to address the
overestimation problem. In this article, we therefore
use this multivariate regression method to estimate the
total (net) effect of education on socio-economic
outcomes among school-leavers who finished upper
secondary and tertiary education in the Netherlands
and to decompose this effect into differences between
study programmes and differences between schools.
1
A second unresolved issue is the explanation of the
effects of education. Human capital theory basically
argues that education is crucial, because it imparts
knowledge and skills that directly affect the worker’s
labour productivity. Job competition theory stipulates
that education is important, because it selects on
general learning abilities, which in turn determine the
individual’s training costs for acquiring job-specific
skills. In this article, we adopt a theoretical model
that combines these two perspectives into one model,
the training costs model (Glebbeek, 1988). We
elaborate that both theories predict different outcomes
for different components of this model. Moreover,
we hypothesize that there are differences among
labour market segments in the mechanisms that
create the allocation and selection process, and that
these differences are the result of the nature of the
employment relationship in different segments
(Sørensen, 1983).
Description of Dutch Education
System
The Dutch education system is regarded as being
highly stratified (both vertical and horizontal) and
highly standardized (Shavit and Mu ¨ller, 1998).
Stratification refers to the extent and form of tracking
at the level of secondary education. In highly stratified
education systems, students are selected into separate
tracks early in the educational career with no or
few possibilities to switch between these tracks.
Standardization refers to the degree to which the
quality of education meets the same standards nation-
wide (with regard to teacher training, school budgets,
curricula, and uniformity of examination or certifica-
tion terms). As can be seen from Figure 1, stratifica-
tion appears relatively early in the educational career of
Dutch students. At the start of secondary education
(at age 12), students are allocated to four major tracks
that differ in both length and level (first-phase
secondary education). This allocation is based on
a national school performance test and the advice of
the teacher from primary education. None of these
four tracks is considered to be proper final levels of
education, although some students leave education
after completion (or even without) of one of these
tracks. However, a large majority of the degree takers
go on to further education. Completion of the highest
of the four tracks (VWO) gives access to the master
programmes at the universities (WO). The next
highest track (HAVO) gives access to the bachelor
programmes in colleges of higher vocational education
(HBO). The two lowest tracks (VBO and MAVO) give
access to the school-based vocational programmes
in (short) senior secondary vocational education
((K)MBO) or to the dual system of apprenticeship
training. Within these levels of education, students are
(within some limitations) free to choose between the
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stratification is quite substantial in the Dutch educa-
tion system and students can choose between some
hundreds of study programmes within each level
(for instance, master level sociology, bachelor level
business administration, senior secondary vocational
education level nurse training, etc.). Most schools offer
a broad range of study programmes and there is no
relation between school quality and the set of study
programmes offered. In the context of this article,
this horizontal differentiation is especially relevant for
studying the effects of education. If education is crucial
in imparting knowledge and skills, then this should not
only be reflected by different socio-economic outcomes
between levels of education, but also by differences
between study programmes within the same level.
Due to the high level of standardization in the Dutch
education system (mainly through national agreed
curricula), the content of these programmes is quite
similar across schools. Nevertheless, schools differ in
educational outcomes (such as the average school
performance of their students). Controlling for
differences in input characteristics (such as social
background and ability), these between-school
differences in educational outcomes in the
Netherlands have been estimated to be some 5–15
per cent for primary and secondary education
(Scheerens and Bosker, 1997) which parallels differ-
ences found elsewhere (Mortimore et al., 1988). It can
therefore be assumed that schools may also differ in
socio-economic outcomes. An earlier Dutch study
indeed seems to point out that there are school
differences in socio-economic outcomes (Bosker et al.,
2001). However, these results were restricted to
colleges of higher vocational education. This article
broadens the focus to the full range of (school-based)
study programmes in the Dutch system of upper
secondary and tertiary education that represent around
85 per cent of the regular outflow to the labour
market.
How Much Does Education
Matter? Statistical Modelling
Issues
Labour market research typically underestimates the
effects of education on socio-economic outcomes,
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Figure 1 The Dutch education system. Note: The percentages show outflow rates to continuing education. For example,
64 per cent of the degree takers from VWO continue in WO and 31 per cent go to HBO. The rest (100 64 31¼5 per
cent) does not go to further education, but enters the labour market. Source: ROA school-leaver survey 1998
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istics such as the level of education. To assess
the total effect of education one should take into
account both measured and unmeasured effects
of education. In a conventional regression model,
taking account of all systematic differences between the
study programmes and between the schools would
require to include a full set of dummy variables
representing all study programmes and all schools.
However, such a model does not take into account
the fact that measurement errors within study
programmes or within schools may be correlated.
A more adequate and parsimonious way to analyse
such data is by applying multilevel analysis. The basic
idea of this multivariate regression method is that data
with a nested structure, are not adequately represented
by the probabilistic model of multiple regression
analysis, but should be analysed in a hierarchical
linear model or random coefficient model (Snijders
and Bosker, 1999).
Let Y denote some socio-economic outcome, X is
a vector of characteristics of individual i, S is a vector
of characteristics of school s and P is a vector of
characteristics of study programme p. R, U and V are
random error terms at the individual, school, and
study programme level, respectively. Then the specified
model is:
Yisp ¼ a1 þ a2ðXÞisp þ a3ðSÞsp þ a4ðPÞp þ Risp
þ Usp þ Vp
This model has a hierarchical structure in which
individuals are nested in school-study programme
combinations (for instance, master level sociology
programme at university X) and these are, in turn,
nested in study programmes (in this example, the
master level sociology programme). Given the high
level of standardization in the Dutch education system,
the particular study programme that someone has
followed is considered to be more important in
affecting socio-economic outcomes than the particular
school that has been attended. This is the reason why
we modelled study programmes as the highest level.
This way we can easily assess the total variation due
to systematic differences between study programmes.
Note that, in order to maintain the hierarchical
structure, the intermediate level has to be defined as
a particular school–study programme combination
rather than a school as a whole. In other words, each
study programme offered in a particular school is
considered as a separate unit at this level. This is
not a problem and gives us the opportunity to model
study programme-specific effectiveness of schools.
Stated differently, schools may not be good in all
programmes they offer, but only in some (for instance,
the quality of study programme p1 might be the
highest in school s1, whereas the quality of study
programme p2 might be the highest in school s2). If we
would look at the general effectiveness of schools, the
school effect may not entirely be picked up, as the
various differences in effectiveness of study pro-
grammes within schools could cancel each other out.
The proposed way of modelling actually allows for the
greatest possibility of detecting school effects.
The usual way to proceed is to start with the
calculation of a baseline model where only the
intercept is estimated. This model gives an indication
of the amount of variation that can be attributed to
the different levels (individuals, schools, study pro-
grammes). However, as indicated earlier, these results
cannot directly be interpreted as effects that are due
to the particular study programme followed or effects
of the school attended. Part of the systematic variation
between study programmes and schools is due to
differential selection of students into study pro-
grammes and schools or to other factors that are
unrelated to characteristics of the study programme
and the school. Without adequate statistical control
for this, we probably overestimate the ‘true’ effects of
education. Therefore, we first estimate a model in
which variables have been included that try to control
for these composition effects, allowing us to get closer
to the ‘true’ effects of education.
The following hypotheses are formulated regarding
the question on how much education matters:
Hypothesis 1: Given the highly standardized and highly
stratified education system in the Netherlands, we expect
small differences between schools (that is, schools*study
programmes) and large differences between study
programmes in socio-economic outcomes.
Hypothesis 2: We expect that the (small) differences
between schools (that is, schools*study programmes) are
larger in the case of employment opportunities and job
security than in the case of wages.
The latter hypothesis is related to the fact that
employment opportunities and job security may vary
between schools offering different support to their
graduates in helping to find a (permanent) job
(Rosenbaum et al., 1990), while wages are often set
in national collective agreements leading to the same
starting salary for two school-leavers who finished the
same occupation-specific study programme at different
schools.
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Theoretical Issues
According to human capital theory (Becker, 1964),
people acquire skills in education that make them
directly productive for jobs. By investing in education,
they improve their labour productivity. As labour
productivity is mainly determined by characteristics of
the worker, investments in education increase their
future wages. Because of wage competition, different
investments in education lead to differences in wage
level, but not in job opportunities as such. This view
has been challenged in the job competition theory
from Thurow (1975). This theory assumes that labour
productivity is determined by job characteristics
instead of worker characteristics. It also assumes that
work-related skills are mainly acquired on-the-job and
not in education. Education in this view serves as
a ‘screening device’ or ‘signal’ (Spence, 1973), indicat-
ing general characteristics such as learning abilities,
motivation and perseverance that enable school-leavers
to acquire new job skills. Whether or not these generic
skills are actually developed in education is not
important. What matters is that these generic skills
are important predictors of the training costs, and
employers will therefore use educational credentials
to screen job applicants and put them in an imaginary
labour queue (Thurow, 1975). Education is one of the
determinants of the relative position in this queue,
and thus affects not only wages (determined by the job
individuals get), but also job opportunities (those with
the least education are always placed behind).
2
Although it is theoretically useful to distinguish
the different mechanisms through which employers
sort and select employees, in reality it is very unlikely
that these selection processes follow a pure human
capital model or a pure job competition model.
In many cases, elements of both types of selection
can be found and it is probably more fruitful to specify
the conditions under which one or the other mechan-
ism prevails than to claim that only one mechanism
explains all. A common element of both theories is
that they assume that employers act rationally and
choose workers with the highest expected productivity.
Glebbeek (1988) has used this similarity between
human capital theory and job competition theory to
develop a model in which the two perspectives are
combined: the training costs model. Following Thurow
(1975), he assumes that workers are primarily selected
on the basis of their expected training costs. He also
assumes that employers cannot assess these expected
training costs directly, but have to infer them from the
average expected training costs of school-leavers
from a specific study programme. Unlike Thurow,
he allows for the possibility that productive skills can
be acquired in education. In his view, the expected
training costs of school-leavers from a certain study
programme are determined by three components.
The first component concerns the relative degree to
which the study programme in question provides the
required skills. This coincides largely with the occupa-
tional specificity of a study programme. The more
specific a study programme prepares for a particular
job, the less additional training school-leavers need.
From this, it follows that school-leavers from more
general study programmes will require more on-the-
job training in order to perform adequately on the
work floor than those who have completed an
occupation-specific study programme, provided that
the latter end up working in a matching job. The
second component relates to the selectivity of the study
programme. Education does not produce a homo-
geneous good. Even school-leavers from the same
study programme may still differ widely in quality.
For the employer, this poses a problem because the
overperformance of one graduate does not simply
compensate the underperformance of another (van der
Velden, 2001). Study programmes differ in the risk
they offer that graduates will pass the exam without
having a minimum level of skills. If we assume that
employers are able to recognize such differences in
selectivity, then this may have an impact on their
recruitment behaviour, and hence on the labour
market position of school-leavers. Highly selective
study programmes offer low risks and vice versa. The
third component relates to the effort that employers
have to make to ‘bridge’ any existing skill deficiencies
of individuals, either at the moment of labour market
entry or in the future career. This component is
linked in particular to the school-leaver’s general
learning capabilities. It is assumed that the greater
the individual learning capabilities are, the lower the
required training costs.
In the empirical analysis of this article, we include
a measure for all three components. The first
component is indicated by the specificity of the study
programme, the second component by the selectivity
of the study programme, and the third by the level of
education. Although the training costs model can be
thought of as comprising both elements of human
capital and job competition theory, it is clear that the
original theories would predict different outcomes for
the separate components. Human capital theory
predicts strong effects of level of education on wages
(and probably other related terms of employment such
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no effect—in a perfect market situation at least—on
employment opportunities. Job competition theory,
however, predicts strong effects of level of education
on all socio-economic outcomes, not only wages. The
component of selectivity is clearly more related to job
competition theory than human capital theory. The
former theory predicts positive effects of selectivity on
job opportunities as well as on wages and other terms
of employment. Finally, the component of specificity is
more related to human capital theory. This theory
predicts a positive effect of specificity on wages
(and other terms of employment), as a result of the
enhancing effect of direct labour productivity.
However, the effect of specificity on employment
opportunities is ambiguous. On the one hand,
specificity leads to clear signals to employers about
the acquired skills, thus improving the transparency
and lowering the search time. On the other
hand, specificity leads to increased job search duration
as supply and demand need more time to meet and
match.
As outlined earlier, it is not very fruitful to
formulate general hypotheses whether selection
mechanisms follow human capital theory or job
competition theory. It is more interesting to show
that under certain conditions one or the other
mechanism prevails. It is clear that the mode of
selection is tightly interwoven with the partition of the
labour market into segments and related differences
in the nature of the employment relationship that
exist between segments (Sørensen, 1983). In open-
employment relationships, which predominate in
profit-maximizing firms, employees are exposed to
competition from other workers on the basis of
their productive capacity and, therefore, human capital
theory applies. In closed-employment relationships,
characterized by strong internal labour markets and
large bureaucratic organizations where productivity
is less relevant, employees are protected from wage
competition and access to jobs (new entries or
promotions) can take place only when there is a
vacancy. This job access is determined by a ranking
of job candidates, as assumed by job competition
theory. Although the distinction between these
two types of employment relationships does not
coincide completely with a distinction between the
public and private sector, we use the latter to
formulate our hypotheses.
3 It is assumed that open-
employment relationships particularly emerge in the
private sector, whereas closed-employment relations
prevail in the public sector. Note, by the way,
that these hypotheses can only be formulated for the
employed labour force and thus relate to job security
and wages only.
Hypothesis 3: We expect that the effects of level of
education on socio-economic outcomes are present both
in the public and in the private sector.
Hypothesis 4: We expect that the effects of the selectivity
of the study programme on socio-economic outcomes are
larger in the public sector than in the private sector.
Hypothesis 5: We expect that the effects of the specificity
of the study programme on socio-economic outcomes are
larger in the private sector than in the public sector.
Data and Variables
Data
For the empirical analysis, we use data from the annual
school-leaver survey conducted by the Research Centre
for Education and the Labour Market (ROA) of
Maastricht University. This cross-sectional survey
maps the transition from school to work for school-
leavers in the Netherlands approximately one-and-a-
half years after leaving education. We analyse the data
collected in 1998, thus covering school-leavers from
the school year 1996–1997. The survey covers school-
leavers with a qualification from any type of secondary
or tertiary education. They received a mail question-
naire that contained questions about employment
opportunities [unemployment (spells), job search
duration], contract type (temporary, part-time con-
tract), job characteristics (wage, job level, job require-
ments), and employer characteristics (sector, firm size).
The school-leaver survey plays an important role in
the Dutch system of educational quality assurance.
That is the main reason why the survey covers a large
part of the total outflow of education. The participa-
tion rate is 100 per cent among universities, 85 per
cent among colleges of higher vocational education,
40 per cent among schools for senior secondary
vocational education and 10 per cent among schools
for general secondary education and junior secondary
vocational education. The sample from the 1998 data
collection is found to be representative for the total
outflow of secondary and tertiary education. Response
rates varied a lot between levels of education: from
39 per cent for short senior secondary vocational
education (KMBO) to 66 per cent for pre-university
education (VWO). These response rates are considered
to be quite good for a mail questionnaire in the
Netherlands. Moreover, an additional survey among
some 1,300 non-respondents showed that the response
70 VAN DER VELDEN AND WOLBERSwas not selective with respect to a number of socio-
economic outcomes. Despite the differences in
response rates, this holds for each level of education.
For the multivariate analysis that is applied, we use the
un-weighted data set. For a more detailed description
of the methodology used in the survey, we refer to
Huijgen and Wolbers (1999).
For the present analysis, we select school-leavers
with a qualification from short senior secondary
vocational education (KMBO), senior secondary voca-
tional education (MBO), higher vocational education
(HBO) or university education (WO). The different
qualifications can be considered as successive in level.
Within this sample, we select those respondents
who belonged to the labour force at the moment of
the survey. Moreover, to exclude respondents that
have already gained work experience before leaving
education, we select on age within each level of
education: KMBO (maximum of 23 years at the
moment of interview), MBO (maximum 25 years),
HBO (maximum 28 years), and WO (maximum
30 years). These selections result in an analytic
sample of maximally 20,112 school-leavers, maximally
993 schools*study programmes, and 215 study pro-
grammes. The data are grouped as a three-level
hierarchy with school-leavers nested in school–study
programme combinations and school–study programme
combinations nested in study programmes.
Dependent Variables
We analyse three socio-economic outcomes that reflect
some of the main dimensions of the labour market
position of school-leavers. The first dependent variable
is the likelihood of being employed as against being
unemployed and actively seeking work. The second
one—restricted to those who are employed—looks at
the likelihood of being employed in a permanent job
rather than being employed on a temporary basis. We
define permanent employment to include jobs with a
contract of unlimited duration and jobs with the
prospect of permanent employment. The third one is
the natural log of the gross hourly wages, originally
measured in guilders but translated into euro accord-
ing to the official exchange rate of 2.21371. Hourly
wages less than 1euro have been recoded to 1euro
before logging them. In the calculation of the hourly
wages, we applied a correction to take account of the
system of minimum youth wages. In the Netherlands,
for those between 16 and 23 years old, there is
a system of minimum youth wages that increases
progressively with age, until it reaches the minimum
wage for 23 years and older. The wages of all
school-leavers aged between 16 and 22 years are
more or less affected in the same way by this
minimum youth wage system. So, we multiplied the
wages of those under the age of 23 with a correction
factor that is the inverse of the ratio of the minimum
wage for that school-leaver’s age and the minimum
wage for 23 years and older.
Independent Variables
The effects of education may be overestimated if one
does not control properly for input characteristics and
other variables that may obscure the net effects of
study programmes and schools. At the school-leaver
level, we therefore include four relevant covariates. Sex
is a dummy variable distinguishing men and women.
Social background is indicated by the parental level of
education, measured as the average years of schooling
of both parents. The assigned scores are as follows:
primary education 6 years, VBO 10 years, MAVO 11
years, HAVO 13 years, MBO 14 years, VWO 15 years,
HBO 17 years, and WO 19 years (see van der Velden
and Smoorenburg (1999) for further details). The
information on the parental level of education is based
on questions to the school-leavers. In the case of
a missing value of one of the parents, the parental level
of education is equal to the level of education
of the other parent. Ethnicity is a dummy variable
distinguishing between ethnic minorities and Dutch
natives. A person of ethnic minority is either someone
who was born abroad and of whom at least one of the
parents was born abroad, or someone of whom both
parents were born abroad. Countries that are classified
as abroad are listed in the Dutch Act for Stimulation
of Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the Labour
Market (SAMEN). The level of first-phase secondary
education indicates the highest track followed
in the first phase of secondary education before
entering higher education (HBO and WO) or (short)
intermediate vocational education ((K)MBO). It dis-
tinguishes pre-university education (VWO), senior
general secondary education (HAVO) and junior
general secondary education/junior secondary voca-
tional education (MAVO/VBO). These tracks have
differential possibilities for continuing education (as
has been shown in Figure 1). However, students do not
necessarily choose the highest form of further educa-
tion possible (de Graaf and Wolbers, 2003). This
variable can be regarded as a good predictor of the
cognitive differences between students when entering
the different study programmes in continuing
education.
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we include the unemployment rate in the region where
the school-leavers attended school (CBS, 2002). A total
of 18 regions (‘RBA-areas’) are distinguished. This
variable is included to control for between-school
variation that is due to regional rather than school-
specific characteristics.
To measure the three components of the training
costs model, the following educational characteristics
are distinguished. The first concerns the level of
education, measured in years of schooling. The
following values are assigned: short senior secondary
vocational education (KMBO) 12 years, senior second-
ary vocational education (MBO) 14 years, higher
vocational education (HBO) 17 years and university
education (WO) 19 years. This implies that this
characteristic is invariant between study programmes
within an educational level. The second educational
characteristic refers to the selectivity of the study
programme. Even within a given level of education,
there is still considerable variation in the quality of the
study programmes offered. To estimate this quality
variation, we calculated for each study programme
the percentage of students having the highest track of
first-phase secondary education (that is, VWO for
those with a study programme in WO or HBO,
HAVO for those with a study programme in MBO
and MAVO or HAVO for those with a study
programme in KMBO). Within each educational
level these indicators were then standardized. This
means that the measure can be compared across levels,
since it gives a ranking of study programmes within
each level of education. The third characteristic is the
specificity of the study programme. This refers to the
relative degree to which the study programme in
question provides the required skills. If school-leavers
from a particular study programme are largely
concentrated in one occupation, then this study
programme is considered to be highly specific. If, on
the other hand, school-leavers from a particular study
programme are dispersed across a great number of
occupations, then it is considered to be highly generic.
The specificity is measured by calculating a Gini–
Hirschman coefficient for the range of occupations for
each study programme. The coefficient can take values
between 0 (all school-leavers are located in one
occupation) and 100 (all school-leavers are equally
distributed across all possible occupations). A high
value therefore represents low specificity. The coeffi-
cients were estimated using the Dutch Labour Force
Surveys of 1995 and 1996. Since we are interested in
the specificity of study programmes, the reverse sign of
the coefficients is used, which means that a high value
indicates a high degree of specificity.
Finally, to specify differences in the effects of the
three educational characteristics between the public
and the private sector, we include—in addition to the
main effect of sector—interaction terms between the
sector variable and the three measures for education.
A statistical description of all variables is presented
in Table 1.
Models
For the analysis of being employed, three models
have been estimated. Model 0 is the baseline model
containing the intercept only. Model 1 includes all
covariates measured at the level of school-leavers and
the level of school-study programme combinations.
Both models together indicate how much education
matters by decomposing the total variation in employ-
ment opportunities among school-leavers into the
three variance components (Model 0) and statistically
controlling for crucial variables to obtain an adequate
estimate of the net variation between study pro-
grammes and between school-study programme com-
binations (Model 1). In Model 2, the three educational
characteristics are added. This model answers the
theoretical question of why education matters. For the
analysis of being employed in a permanent job and
the analysis of gross hourly wages, four models have
been estimated. Models 1, 2, and 3 are comparable
with the analysis of being employed. In Model 4,
we add a dummy variable that distinguishes the private
from the public sector and interaction terms between
this variable and the three educational characteristics.
One particular issue to be raised is the calculation of
variance components in the case of logistic multilevel
analysis. To calculate the explained variance in the
estimated logistic 3-level models (that is, when
analysing the likelihood of being employed and the
likelihood of being employed in a permanent job), we
follow the method proposed by Snijders and Bosker
(1999: 225–227). The explained variance is calculated
as the observed variance of the linear predictor for Yisp
using the estimated coefficients of the model. The total
variance is then calculated as the sum of this explained
variance plus the residual variance at level one (fixed at
1 due to the binary character of the dependent
variable), level two, and level three. However, note
that ‘such values are known for single-level logistic
regression to be usually considerably smaller than the
OLS R
2 values obtained for predicting continuous
outcomes’ (Snijders and Bosker, 1999: 226).
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Being Employed
Table 2 displays the results of a logistic 3-level
random intercept model analysing the likelihood of
being employed. Model 0 shows significant variation
in the likelihood of being employed between
study programmes. Although there is also variation
between school-study programme combinations, this
variation is not significantly different from zero.
The variation between study programmes is larger
than the variation between school–study programme
combinations. The gross variation between study
programmes is 26.6 per cent of the estimated total
variation, while the variation between school-study
programme combinations is only 7.9 per cent,
indicating that the study programme followed affects
the likelihood of having a job much more than the
specific school where the study programme was
followed. This is in accordance with Hypothesis
1. As the variance at the level of school-leavers is
fixed at 1, the residual variance components cannot be
directly compared across the different models. We
therefore look at the changes in the percentages rather
than the changes in the variances itself. After
introduction of the covariates in Model 1, almost
4 per cent of the estimated total variance can be
explained. Most of this explained variance is related to
a decrease in residual variance at the level of study
programmes. The residual variance at the level of study
programmes drops from 26.6 to 22.8 per cent, which
implies that around one-seventh ((1 22.8/26.6) 100)
of the gross variance at this level can be attributed to
the included covariates. The residual variance at the
level of school–study programme combinations hardly
changes (or, in fact, increases slightly from 7.9 to 9.0
per cent), indicating that no variation between school–
study programme combinations can be ascribed to the
covariates. The total net effect of education (that is, the
net effect of having followed a particular study
programme at a particular school) is estimated to
explain a maximum of one-third (9.0þ22.8 per cent)
of all differences between school-leavers in the like-
lihood of being employed. Introduction of other
(omitted) covariates could possibly lower this
percentage.
In Model 2, the educational characteristics are
added, which leads to only a very small decrease in
the residual variance at the level of study programmes
(from 22.8 to 20.4 per cent) and no change in residual
variance at the level of school–study programme
combinations. This implies that the net variation
between study programmes and between school–study
programme combinations can hardly be ascribed
to any of the included educational characteristics.
Table 1 Statistical description of the variables used in the multilevel analysis (maximally 20,112 school-leavers
within maximally 993 schools*study programmes within 215 study programmes)
Percentage Mean SD
Independent variables
Level 1 variables
Female (versus male) 55
Ethnic minority (versus native Dutch) 3
First-phase secondary education HAVO (versus VBO/MAVO) 47
First-phase secondary education VWO (versus VBO/MAVO) 16
Parental level of education (6–19) 12.04 2.99
Private sector (versus public sector) 68
Level 2 variable
Regional unemployment rate (3–8) 5.10 1.13
Level 3 variables
Level of education (12–19) 16.89 2.11
Selectivity of study programme ( 0.59–0.99)  0.02 0.21
Specificity of study programme ( 17.85– 1.15)  9.43 5.08
Dependent variables
Being employed (versus unemployed) 97
Being employed in a permanent job (versus temporary job) 85
Log gross hourly wages (0–5.29) 2.22 0.33
Source: ROA school-leaver survey 1998.
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programme. If the selectivity is increased with one
point, then the odds of being employed increase with
141 (e
0.878¼2.406) per cent.
Being Employed in a Permanent Job
Table 3 presents the results with respect to the
likelihood of being employed in a permanent job.
If we look at the estimates of the variance components
in Model 0, we can conclude that there is significant
variation only at the level of study programmes:
27.2 per cent of the total variance. The variance at
the level of schools*study programmes is 0.1 per cent.
These results support Hypothesis 1. Introduction of the
covariates in Model 1 causes a drop in the variance at
the level of study programmes from 27.2 to 23.2 per
cent. Model 1 indicates that the total net effect of
education is 23.5 per cent (¼0.3þ23.2 per cent) of the
total variation. In other words, a maximum of one-
quarter of the differences between school-leavers in the
likelihood of being employed in a permanent job
can be attributed to the specific programme they have
followed (and the specific school they have attended).
Introducing the three educational characteristics in
Model 2 explains only a part of the differences between
study programmes and school–study programme
combinations as found in Model 1. The residual
variance at the level of study programmes is now
21.2 per cent. This means that less than 10 per cent of
the net variation between study programmes can be
ascribed to the modelled educational characteristics.
Only the level of education has a significant effect on
the likelihood of being employed in a permanent job.
Each additional year of schooling increases the odds
with 11 per cent (e
0.101¼1.106).
In Model 3 the effects of the three educational
characteristics are estimated separately for the private
and public sector.
5 In this model, the residual variance
at the level of study programmes further decreases
to 19.9 per cent. The main effect of level of education
is no longer significant, while the interaction term with
the private sector is significant. In other words,
Hypothesis 3 is only partly confirmed. There is no
effect of level of education in the public sector, but
there is a strong effect of education in the private
sector. The latter effect is 0.134 (0.061þ0.073). In
addition, the interaction terms reveal that the effect of
the selectivity of the study programme is larger in
the private sector as well, although in neither the
private nor the public sector this effect differs
statistically from the value zero. This finding contra-
dicts Hypothesis 4, where we expected the opposite to
hold true. Finally, the results show no difference in the
Table 2 Results of logistic 3-level analysis of being employed: logit effects (20,112 school-leavers within 993
schools*study programmes within 215 study programmes)
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 3.463** 4.745** 5.233**
Level 1 variables
Female (versus male)  0.169  0.176
Ethnic minority (versus native Dutch)  0.741**  0.751**
First-phase secondary education HAVO (versus VBO/MAVO)  0.119  0.074
First-phase secondary education VWO (versus VBO/MAVO)  0.018  0.041
Parental level of education  0.043**  0.041**
Level 2 variable
Regional unemployment rate  0.109**  0.115**
Level 3 variables
Level of education  0.017
Selectivity of study programme 0.878**
Specificity of study programme 0.022
Variance components (percentages)
Residual variance level 1: school-leavers 1.000 (65.5) 1.000 (64.4) 1.000 (63.5)
Residual variance level 2: schools*study programmes 0.121 (7.9) 0.140 (9.0) 0.142 (9.0)
Residual variance level 3: study programmes 0.406** (26.6) 0.354** (22.8) 0.322** (20.4)
Explained variance 0.000 (0.0) 0.058 (3.7) 0.112 (7.1)
Total variance 1.527 (100.0) 1.552 (100.0) 1.576 (100.0)
Significance: *P<0.05; **P<0.01 (two-tailed).
Source: ROA school-leaver survey 1998.
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the two sectors. So, Hypothesis 5 is not confirmed.
Gross Hourly Wages
Table 4 gives the results of the wage analysis. Striking
is the fact that wages are much more affected
by differences between study programmes than (per-
manent) employment opportunities. From the total
variation in wages, 48.0 per cent can be attributed
to differences between study programmes (see
Model 1). In the analysis regarding (permanent)
employment opportunities, these figures were around
27 per cent. Just like the analysis of permanent
employment, the wage analysis shows no variation at
the level of school–study programme combinations. For
the analysis of being employed, the variation at the
level of school–study programme combinations was 7.9
per cent. This is larger than the variation in the case of
permanent employment and wages, but note that this
variation too is not significant. All in all, we conclude
that these findings support Hypothesis 1 and partly
support Hypothesis 2.
Introduction of the covariates in Model 1 causes
hardly any change in the residual variance at the
level of school-leavers, but the residual variance at
the level of study programmes drops from 48.0 to
44.8 per cent. Overall, this indicates that wage
differences are not very strongly related to any of the
included variables.
When the three educational characteristics are added
in Model 2, the residual variance at the level of study
programmes drops sharply from 44.8 to 16.0 per cent.
Again, we can note a remarkable difference with the
Table 3 Results of 3-level analysis of being employed in a permanent job: logit effects (18,770 school-leavers
within 982 schools*study programmes within 215 study programmes)
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 1.662** 2.266** 0.595 1.198*
Level 1 variables
Female (versus male)  0.283**  0.281**  0.269**
Ethnic minority (versus native Dutch)  0.358**  0.354**  0.348**
First-phase secondary education HAVO
(versus VBO/MAVO)
0.021  0.065  0.062
First-phase secondary education VWO
(versus VBO/MAVO)
0.123 0.056 0.057
Parental level of education  0.019**  0.021**  0.021**
Private sector (versus public sector)  1.115*
Level 2 variable
Regional unemployment rate  0.045*  0.040*  0.039*
Level 3 variables
Level of education 0.101** 0.061
Selectivity of study programme 0.234  0.362
Specificity of study programme  0.006 0.013
Interactions
Level of education*private sector
(versus public sector)
0.073**
Selectivity of study programme*private sector
(versus public sector)
0.767**
Specificity of study programme*private sector
(versus public sector)
 0.021
Variance components (percentages)
Residual variance level 1: school-leavers 1.000 (72.7) 1.000 (74.2) 1.000 (72.9) 1.000 (72.3)
Residual variance level 2: schools*study
programmes
0.001 (0.1) 0.004 (0.3) 0.000 (0.0) 0.001 (0.1)
Residual variance level 3: study programmes 0.374** (27.2) 0.313** (23.2) 0.290** (21.2) 0.276**(19.9)
Explained variance 0.000 (0.0) 0.031 (2.3) 0.081 (5.9) 0.107 (7.7)
Total variance 1.375 (100.0) 1.348 (100.0) 1.371 (100.0) 1.384 (100.0)
Significance: *P<0.05; **P<0.01 (two-tailed).
Source: ROA school-leaver survey 1998.
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where the reduction in the residual variance was
much smaller. The only significant effect on wages is
from the level of education. Each additional year of
schooling increases the wage level by 9 per cent
(e
0.082¼1.085).
In Model 3, the effects of the three educational
characteristics are once again estimated separately for
the private and the public sector. In this model,
the residual variance at the level of study programmes
is 14.4 per cent. The results reveal that all three
interactions are significant. First of all, the effect
of level of education is present in both the public
and the private sector—which supports Hypothesis 3—,
although the effect is larger in the latter sector
(0.055þ0.036¼0.091). Second, and contrary to
Hypothesis 4, the impact of the selectivity of the
study programme is larger in the private sector than
in the public sector. Third, the effect of the specificity
of the study programme is smaller in the private sector
than in the public sector—which is in contrast to
Hypothesis 5—, although in both sectors the effect is
not statistically deviating from the value zero.
Conclusions and Discussion
The empirical evidence presented in this article demon-
strates that labour market research typically under-
estimates the total effect of education, because it does not
take into account unmeasured characteristics of educa-
tion. This underestimation (that is, the residual variance
at the level of study programmes and school–study
programme combinations) is 29 per cent in the analysis
Table 4 Results of 3-level analysis of log gross hourly wages: unstandardized regression coefficients (17,561
school-leavers within 975 schools*study programmes within 215 study programmes)
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 2.207** 2.212** 0.837** 1.337**
Level 1 variables
Female (versus male)  0.044**  0.045**  0.047**
Ethnic minority (versus native Dutch) 0.022 0.023 0.020
First-phase secondary education HAVO
(versus VBO/MAVO)
0.012* 0.006 0.006
First-phase secondary education VWO
(versus VBO/MAVO)
0.020** 0.018** 0.017*
Parental level of education 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
Private sector (versus public sector)  0.680**
Level 2 variable
Regional unemployment rate  0.006**  0.006**  0.005**
Level 3 variables
Level of education 0.082** 0.055**
Selectivity of study programme  0.006  0.011
Specificity of study programme  0.000 0.002
Interactions
Level of education*private sector
(versus public sector)
0.036**
Selectivity of study programme*private sector
(versus public sector)
0.067**
Specificity of study programme*private sector
(versus public sector)
 0.003**
Variance components (percentages)
Residual variance level 1: school-leavers 0.065** (52.0) 0.064** (51.2) 0.064** (51.2) 0.064** (51.2)
Residual variance level 2: schools*study
programmes
0.000 (0.0) 0.000 (0.0) 0.000 (0.0) 0.000 (0.0)
Residual variance level 3: study programmes 0.060** (48.0) 0.056** (44.8) 0.020** (16.0) 0.018** (14.4)
Explained variance 0.000 (0.0) 0.005 (4.0) 0.041 (32.8) 0.043 (34.4)
Total variance 0.125 (0.0) 0.125 (100.0) 0.125 (100.0) 0.125 (100.0)
Significance: *P<0.05; **P<0.01 (two-tailed).
Source: ROA school-leaver survey 1998.
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permanently employed and 14 per cent in the analysis of
gross hourly wages. We have to keep in mind, however,
that the underestimation in the case of the effects of
education on (permanent) employment opportunities
may be exaggerated. The comparison between the
estimated multilevel models may be problematic, as the
explained variance in a logistic multilevel analysis (that
is, in the analysis of (permanent) employment) is
considerably smaller than in a multilevel analysis with
a metric dependent variable (that is, in the wage analysis)
(Snijders and Bosker, 1999:226).
Overestimation, on the other hand, does not seem
to present a major problem: after controlling for
differential selection of students in study programmes
and the location of schools in regions with different
labour market conditions, the effects of education
decrease only slightly. Once again, we need to be
careful when comparing the explained variances of
binary and metric-dependent variables. Moreover, we
should be aware that these results reflect a minimum
degree of overestimation, as only a restricted number
of covariates has been included.
6 On the other hand,
it is unlikely that introduction of other relevant
characteristics will change the findings drastically: the
model already contains some of the most important
predictors and even these do not affect the estimation
of the net effects of education very much.
The estimation of the total net effect of education
varies widely between the different socio-economic
outcomes under investigation. Almost one-half of
the variation in wages is related to education. In
the case of employment opportunities this effect is
substantially lower: around one-third of the variation
in the likelihood of being employed is associated with
education. In the case of permanent employment
opportunities, the total net effect of education is about
one-quarter of the variation. Put differently, wages
are to a larger extent determined by educational
credentials than (permanent) employment opportu-
nities, while the latter are more affected by individual
differences.
In the Netherlands, schools do not matter signifi-
cantly when decomposing the effects of education into
differences between study programmes and differences
between schools. Less than 1 per cent of the total
variation in the likelihood of having a permanent job
and wages can be attributed to differences between
schools. These small school effects are in line with
the highly standardized education system in the
Netherlands, where differences in school quality are,
generally speaking, rather modest. However, schools do
make some difference in helping their school-leavers
to actually find a job: 9 per cent of the variation
in the likelihood of being employed can be attributed
to the specific school that was attended. Note that this
school effect was found after controlling for regional
differences in the labour market situation. It probably
relates to activities such as career counselling or
differences between schools in establishing networks
with prospective employers.
For the most part, the effects of education on socio-
economic outcomes reflect differences in study
programmes. It is likely that this result is related to
the high level of stratification in the Dutch education
system. Level of education turned out to have the most
profound effects. High-educated school-leavers
more often have a permanent job and earn more
than low-educated school-leavers. In fact, these results
echo previous research on the impact of level of
education on socio-economic outcomes. In addition,
the selectivity of the study programme shows an
interesting effect. Having followed a study programme
that is highly selective on entry has a positive effect
on the likelihood of being employed. Since we
controlled for the school-leaver’s entry level of
education (that is, the level of first-phase secondary
education), this selectivity effect is a study programme
effect rather than an individual effect. Finally, we
found that—contrasting our hypotheses—the effect of
level of education and the selectivity of the study
programme on the likelihood of permanent employ-
ment and wages are larger in the private than in the
public sector, whereas the reverse is true for the effect
of the specificity of the study programme on wages.
It is clear that these results cannot simply be
explained in terms of the theoretical arguments we
have outlined. The absence of an effect of level of
education on the likelihood of being employed could
point in the direction of human capital theory, but this
is contradicted by the fact that we found a positive
effect of the selectivity of the study programme on
job chances, which is more associated with job
competition theory. Moreover, we hypothesized that
selection processes in the private sector with its open-
employment positions follow a human capital
model with strong effects of level of education and
specificity, while in the public sector with its emphasis
on credentials, level of education and selectivity
would be the dominant factors. This is less puzzling
if we take some other structural and institutional
factors into account. First of all, (youth) unemploy-
ment in the Netherlands in the late 1990s was
extremely low. This means that higher-educated
school-leavers did not have to compete with lower-
educated ones for the same jobs. Within each segment,
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selective study programmes, as is illustrated by the
positive effect of selectivity. A second factor is the
more institutionalized wage-setting mechanism in
the public sector. As a result, the overall wage
inequality is much smaller in the public sector than
in the private sector. The same applies to other terms
of employment. Permanent employment opportunities
are larger in the public sector than in the private one.
Especially the lower educated and those coming from
less-selective study programmes profited from this.
Also the positive effect of specificity in the public
sector points to an absence of market mechanisms in
professionalized segments such as health care, where
job access is controlled by the professional elite. In
the private sector, however, where open-employment
relationships force employers to look for job applicants
with the highest expected productivity, level of
education and selectivity have profound effects on
wages and permanent employment opportunities.
The results of this article lead to three possible
extensions for future research. First, we should
improve upon the measures used for the different
components of the training costs model. The measure
of the specificity of the study programme is strictly
speaking not equivalent to the relative degree to which
the study programme in question provides the
required skills. Nor does the measure of selectivity
fully grasp the risk that students will pass the exam
without having a minimum level of skills. Even in the
case of the third component, the effort that employers
have to make to ‘bridge’ any existing skill deficiencies,
one may question whether level of education is
a sufficient measure. We expect that improvements
in these measures will lead to a better explanation of
the effects of education.
Second, the results indicate that apart from
educational characteristics, structural and institutional
factors shape the school-to-work transition. Changes
in the opportunity structure may interact with the
effects of the educational characteristics. Moreover,
institutional factors may obscure the ‘normal’ effects
of education, leading to either stronger or weaker
effects than theoretically predicted. Although taking
into account regional unemployment rates and
distinguishing between the private and the public
sector has already shed some light on the role of these
factors, it is clear that we should elaborate our models
much more in this direction.
Third, the results refer to a population of school-
leavers from one single country. The question is to what
extent the results can be generalized to the whole Dutch
population or to other countries than the Netherlands.
Following signalling theory (Spence, 1973), we may
expect that educational credentials are especially rele-
vant during the transition from school to work and
that individual traits become more important in
determining the further career. This means that the
effects of education are largest among the group of
school-leavers and that the total effect of education
decreases over the life course. In that sense, one could
argue that the effects of education found here provide
an upper limit of the total effect of education. But the
relative importance of the different training costs
components may change as well. Having followed a
study programme that specifically prepares for certain
occupations, may provide school-leavers an entrance
ticket to the labour market, but may also in the long-
term have a negative effect when technological devel-
opments change the skills requirements and make the
existing skills obsolete. Moreover, specificity may have a
negative effect on the flexibility of school-leavers to take
other jobs, not related to their study programme. This
may especially become relevant in the long-run. It is
important, therefore, to investigate the long-term effects
of education as well. Moreover, it would be interesting
to see to what extent similar results can be found in
other countries. As we indicated earlier, the Dutch
education system can be characterized as highly
standardized and highly stratified. This is probably the
reason why schools matter so little in the Netherlands
and why study programmes matter so much. Does this
imply that in countries where the education system is
less standardized and stratified, such as in the USA, we
will find much more variation between schools or
colleges and less so between study programmes? And
what about the relative importance of the different
training costs components? It is likely that in countries
characterized by occupational labour markets, the
relative degree to which a specific programme provides
the required skills is more important than in countries
where internal labour markets prevail (Gangl, 2001).
And conversely, the other two components will
probably prevail in countries with a strong emphasis
on internal labour markets. Therefore, we aim at
extending our research to other countries, in order to
explore the validity of this expected cross-national
variation in outcomes.
Notes
1. In some sense, the term ‘total’ effect of education
may be misleading, since the lowest educated
school-leavers are not analysed in this article.
Nevertheless, we think that it is possible to speak
78 VAN DER VELDEN AND WOLBERSabout the total effect of education without
having the total variation in education. In
fact, the restricted sample will result in a
conservative estimation of the total effect of
education.
2. Credential theory (Collins, 1979) goes even
further by arguing that elites use educational
credentials to control the access to high-level
status groups. As Bills (2003) points out, the
credential view opposes human capital theory as
well as job competition theory in the sense that it
basically challenges the relationship between
education and labour productivity. In the absence
of any direct assessment of the actual skills of
workers on the one hand and their productivity
on the other, there is no way to empirically
settle this issue. Therefore, we focus in this article
only on the human capital and job competition
theory.
3. The operationalization of open- versus closed-
employment relationships as private versus public
sector is not ideal, because there is also a class
dimension involved (closed positions are typical
for jobs in the salariat even within the private
sector) and open positions are presumably only
present when there is free market competition
(which is likely to be only in a few segments of
the Dutch economy due to minimum-wage
regulations).
4. Based on another data set (VOCL’89), we
calculated the correlation between the choice of
the level of first-phase secondary education
and the final level of educational attainment
(measured as years of schooling) at 0.50.
Moreover, multivariate analysis on the same data
set showed that among a great number of
independent variables (like parental socio-economic
status, parental level of education, ethnicity, IQ,
student’s scores on nationally standardized tests on
Dutch language, arithmetic, and information
processing at age 12), the advice given by the
primary school teacher concerning the level of
first-phase secondary education (which coincides
largely with the actual choice of first-phase
secondary education) is by far the best predictor
of the final level of education attained (Traag et al.,
2004).
5. It is questionable whether sector is exogeneous to
permanent employment. However, our prime
interest is not in the main effect of sector.
Rather, we are interested in the interaction effects
between sector and the measured educational
characteristics to distinguish between human
capital and job competition explanations of
effects of education.
6. Most surprising is the finding that the effect of the
level of first-phase secondary education is barely
noticeable, despite the fact that it is strongly
correlated with the final level of education (see
Note 4). Maybe this is because the sample excludes
the least qualified, leading to restricted variation in
cognitive ability between students when entering
the different study programmes in upper second-
ary and tertiary education. It may also be that we
used a poor measure of the level of first-phase
secondary education in the sense that selection
into study programmes on the basis of ability
(or some similar unobserved variable) is badly
represented by this variable.
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